You might be interested in the historical significance of this term. Search or search for historical law wishes in the Encyclopedia of Law. Search the Dictionary of Legal Abbreviations and Acronyms for legal acronyms and/or abbreviations containing wishes. But besides the arbitrary nature of these declarations, the crusader`s vow was solemn, without being bound by a more general vow of obedience; And we have seen that surrender is not solemnity. For this reason, we prefer a simple opinion which, in agreement with Vasquez (In I-II, Q. xcvi, d. clxv, especially n° 83) and Sanchez (In decalogum, 1, 5, c. 1, nos. 11-13), places the material solemnity of religious vows in devotion, followed by irrevocable acceptance; and with Laymann (De statu religioso, c. i, n. 4), Pellizarius (Manuale regularium, tr. IV, c. i.
nn. 10-18). Medina (De sacrorum hominum continentia, l. 4, controv. 7, c. xxxviii), V. De Buck (De solemnitate votorum epistola), Nilles (De juridica votorum solemnitate) and Palmieri (Opus theol., II, pp. 445, 446) respect the ordinary legal meaning of the solemn act.
Legal ceremonies are formalities that must be respected in order to give the act either its legal value, or at least the more or less precious guarantee of any authenticity. This very simple explanation explains the historical changes, both those relating to the number and conditions of vows and those affecting their effects. It is natural that there should be greater difficulties in obtaining a dispensation from a solemn vow, and also that the Church should attach certain handicaps to such a vow. But these effects of solemn vows cannot constitute the essence of such vows. Be that as it may, canon law today does not recognize any solemn vows, except for the vow of chastity, which is solemnly taken by the religious professions in a strictly so-called order. The vows pronounced in religious congregations, such as the simple vows which precede solemn confession in religious orders, and also the complementary simple vows which follow the profession in certain institutes, and finally the final simple vows made in certain religious orders instead of solemn profession, are strictly private; but they derive a certain authenticity from the consent of the Church and the circumstances in which they are taken. The vow is also recognized by God because it is useful to man; This strengthens his will to do what is right. The Protestants of the sixteenth century, who followed Wycliffe, declared themselves against the vows; but Luther and Calvin condemned only vows relating to acts which were not obligatory, the second because he regarded all good deeds as obligatory, the first because the vow of free action contradicted the spirit of the new law. Both denied that the vow was an act of religion and justified it by the simple human reason to strengthen the will. Some recent trends have downplayed the importance of at least the wishes of members of religious communities. Errors of this kind are due to the excessive insistence that vows, and in particular the eternal vow of chastity, religious life or missionary work, do not imply any particular instability in the person who makes them, but only the natural inconstancy to the human will; And that, rather than denoting the reluctant service of a slave, they imply rather the enthusiasm of a generous willingness to give and sacrifice beyond what is necessary, and at the same time so sincere in self-knowledge that it imitates the warriors who burned their ships to cut off the possibility and even the temptation to escape.
In the case of an immutable will, a wish would be meaningless; there is no point in offering perseverance that can never be perceived as deficient; for this reason, it is not suitable for Christ or angels or blesseds in heaven. In itself, the vow establishes a personal commitment that does not flow from the virtue of justice and that seems to end with the death of the vow. However, it is accepted that heirs are obliged to fulfill vows, which are called real because they imply a promise to give up certain property or money; the origin of this obligation is the Roman law “De pollicitionibus”, which is recognized as canon law. As for its nature, it is an obligation of religion if the person making the vow has not bequeathed the property in his will. In that case, the obligation would be just; But in other cases, since the law does not mention a specific title, but simply declares that the obligation of vows passes to the heirs, we conclude that these are talis qualis, that is, a religious obligation. He took his vows on 30 September. June, and I remember thinking at the time how strange it seemed. This statement also shows us that a vow is an act of religion, like any sacrifice offered to God. It is a confession that God deserves to abandon our actions, and a recognition of the order that makes Him our ultimate end. By completing our commitments, we declare that God deserves more than He requires. Finally, we see why God always makes a vow, because since all our actions should ultimately be directed to Him, we cannot give a final promise of those actions to anyone other than God. The promises made to the saints cannot be lightly neglected without diminishing the honor we owe them; But a failure in this regard, while serious in itself, is far less serious than the breaking of a vow to which it certainly resembles.
These promises sometimes imply a wish. God is very pleased with the honor given to His saints, and they rejoice in the glory that has been given to God. We can then affirm with a vow the promise made to a saint, and we can also honor a saint with a vow to God, such as the building of a temple for divine worship in memory of a saint. The exemption from a vow is usually justified by great difficulty in fulfilling it, or by the fact that it was made without proper consideration, or by the likelihood of greater good for the person making it or for others, such as a family, the state, or the church. In renouncing vows, the ecclesiastical superior does not renounce any divine law, but exercises the power of keys, the power to bind and release to forgive the debt to God: and this power seems so useful to society that, even if it had not been formally conferred by Christ, We could say that it would always have belonged to the authority responsible for the public interests of religion. (See Francisco Suárez, “De religione”, VI, Q. xviii.) The direct annulment of vows is more difficult to explain; For no one can have a power that goes so far as to interfere with the inner actions of another human being. A son who has not yet reached puberty may also make a marriage vow without the consent of his parents; Why, because of his young age, does he seem unable to bind himself to God by any vow? It should be noted that the distinction between direct and indirect cancellation in St. Thomas, or Cajetan, dates back to a later period. In the case of Lehmkuhl, we cannot explain this power without the intervention of ecclesiastical authority: in our opinion, given the weakness of minors and the situation of nuns and married women, the Church grants them a general conditional dispensation, that is, a dispensation at the discretion of the father, superior or husband. The power to commute vows does not give the power to renounce them; But power over vows, according to a probable opinion, may extend to oaths and even vows confirmed by oaths. A vow is not a contract, it is a decision that is made and insisted upon.
Marriage vows are binding promises made by each partner from one couple to another during a wedding ceremony. Marital customs have evolved over the course of history and change with the development of human society. In ancient times and in most cultures, the consent of the partner was not as important as it is today, at least in Western societies and among those who influenced it.  Protestants, for example, regard the marriage vow as an immutable divine law, because it requires not only “conciliar affirmation” but also the support of Scripture, which makes marriage a form of divine ordinance.  The obligation of the vow is lifted not only by the performance of the promised work, but also by the effective replacement of a better work and by any circumstance that would have prevented the birth of the obligation; as when work has become useless, useless or impossible.