As we move on to the next section of this paper, it is important to mention that some of the points in the text I have just covered have at least been highlighted by other commentators. Carl Stange (1900), for example, also refers to Kant`s assertion that all technical imperatives belong to theoretical philosophy, but as he is more interested in the question of what is the significance of this statement for Kant`s definition of an imperative, the distinction between imperatives and laws, and the significance of these questions for Kant`s treatment of the categorical imperative, He does not insist. like me, on the implications that this statement has for Kant`s broader accounts of instrumental and prudent reason. Moreover, crucially, because Stange`s narrative is not pushed in the direction that mine, his article has not been able to address the challenge I am about to address—namely, whether we should not simply consider the practical arts and the imperatives associated with them as some kind of “hybrid” case. in which theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy overlap. This failure is significant, because since Stange does not address or acknowledge this challenge, Konrad Cramer (1972: 176) and Konstantin Pollok (2007: 68) may later assume that Kant`s intention in the third critique was to advocate a hybrid treatment of nonmoral practical reason. As this article progresses, and as I build evidence against a hybrid reading of nonmoral practical reason, it becomes clear why Cramer and Pollok`s proposition is untenable. Moreover, amoral means “to be neither moral nor immoral” or specifically “to be outside the sphere to which moral judgments apply.” Does the situation require individuals to make ethical judgments? Do you think about whether an action is morally good or bad, or whether a person`s motives are morally good or bad? Could you discuss what someone “should” or “should” morally do in this situation? Once this point is noted, it becomes clear that Wood and Hill are advocating what contemporary literature on instrumental rationality would call a “broad” reading of the hypothetical imperative. To echo Hill`s formulation, the hypothetical imperative commands: “If a person wants an end and certain means are necessary to achieve that end and are within his power, then he should want those means.” Since Hill (and Wood) will understand this as a command either to end the means or to abandon the end if the necessary means or actions prove impermissible, they understand the “duty” in the imperative, beyond the whole conditional—that is, to have a “broad” scope.
This can be compared to a “narrow” interpretation of a non-moral imperative. In this interpretation, the “should” has only room for manoeuvre; Thus, the end of skill or prudence makes rationally obliged to take the means. For useful discussions on the distinction between broad and narrow scope, see Way (2010), Shpall (2013), Brunero (2010), Broome (2007) and Kiesewetter (2017). On Hill as an advocate of a broad interpretation, cf. Schroeder (2005: 358). I thank the anonymous reviewer who suggested examining the relationship between Kant and the current debate on a broad/narrow area, and I refer to some aspects of this debate in footnotes 14, 15, 36 and 39. I limit my comments on this contemporary debate to the footnotes of this article, as it is difficult to reconcile it properly with Kantian research. These challenges are discussed for the first time in footnote 14 and revisited in footnotes 36 and 39. According to many scholars, moral norms have the following characteristics, namely: Since this is the sum of what Kant is trying to say here about the end of his own happiness, he seems to lead us unequivocally to conclude that nature and freedom form opposing philosophies at all levels of description. Non-moral ends such as happiness belong to natural philosophy, not only because these natural ends are governed by natural laws, but also, according to Kant, because the will itself must be thought to assume the quality of a natural object, insofar as it strives to achieve these goals. It would be a violation of the exclusivity between a system of knowledge according to nature and a system of knowledge according to the freedom to understand oneself differently. There is no other point of view from which we can examine the will and, therefore, hasten the strategy that Kant attempted in texts such as the Fundamental Work, no general or non-moral rules governing his legitimate destiny.
Based on these points, it seems so far that Kant in the Third Critique tends towards the minimalist understanding of the hypothetical imperatives of competence that we have considered in the context of Groundwork II. This proposition can only be preliminary until we examine whether Kant says something elsewhere in the Third Critique to clarify whether there is such a thing as a “hypothetical imperative.” But if we begin with the question of whether the imperatives of competence form a subset within a general practical philosophy, and thus whether a practical philosophy can be developed on their basis that involves more than one moral doctrine, Kant`s answer seems to be no. The imperatives of competence exist within the framework of theoretical philosophy, and so it seems that an account of the imperatives of competence must be strictly based on the naturalistic concepts provided by such a philosophy. In this case, the imperatives of competence only indicate that there are cause-and-effect relationships between ends and means, and that people will achieve their goals only by taking care of these relationships. When thinking of a moral claim versus an immoral claim, it is important to realize that the word “immoral” is not the same as “immoral.” Similarly, in V-Mo/Mron II 29:617, a little over 15 pages, after Kant indicated a general practical philosophy and several reasons by which actions can become “necessary according to reason,” Kant reminds us that pragmatic or wise imperatives can never comply.