A factual definition of the family, which is not only related to the legal concepts of consanguinity, is approved by the courts. It is the reality that counts. If a group of persons has reciprocal obligations of a natural or moral nature to maintain and care matters, there is a family relationship with respect to the factual presumption that most family arrangements are not contractual in nature. If such a relationship exists, it is reasonable to assume that the agreement should not result in contractual consequences. If the court has independent jurisdiction over the procedure, we find no valid reason why a husband who applies for the registration of a judgment and has made it final can then challenge the judgment in another jurisdiction. The theory of unilateral guilt in divorce proceedings does not always coincide with reality. Guilt is usually shared, and the parties` respective position as plaintiff or defendant can sometimes be determined by the chivalrous attitude of the husband, or sometimes by sentimental or religious reasons of the wife that lead her to play a passive role in the dissolution of the marriage. The wife`s failure to defend or cross-appeal may be based on the understanding that the decree provides for her support. If this agreement takes the form of a signed clause filed in the proceedings and the court has jurisdiction, the husband should be prevented from challenging the judgment, unless there is no clearly expressed intention or legal obstacle to the contrary.

The amount may be modified to take account of changing circumstances; If legally flexible, courts should grant remedies, but not invalidate this part of the decree, unless it is null and void as contra bonos customs. The latter question, as applicable in the present case, may be examined immediately. The Court of Appeal upheld; Although a contract between the parties for services to the deceased only needs to be proven by a preponderance of evidence, family arrangements are not normally intended to be contractual in nature, unless there is evidence that the parties expect a legal obligation. The plaintiffs did not meet their burden that the parties wanted their agreement to be contractual. Notwithstanding the foregoing legal standards, we have carefully reviewed the respondent`s allegations of error and determined that each of them was unfounded. [6] Since the jurisdiction of the State of Nevada has been established, the judgment rendered and subject to that jurisdiction should be governed by the laws of Nevada to establish its regularity and validity. “The judicial proceedings of one State are not capable of being controlled or restricted by other States to the extent that treaties are. A treaty concluded in one State which is to be performed in another State and which is contrary to the public policy of which it is contrary need not be enforced by the courts of that State; But the law of another state or the judgment of its courts rests on a higher basis.

The courts of one State may not refuse to comply with the judgment of the courts of another State on the ground that it is based on a law which is not applicable in the first State. A judgment of a fraternal State is entitled to respect, full faith and recognition in other States, however different the law. (15 R. C. L., P. 916.) (See also 4 A.L.R. 968; 10 A.L.R. 716; 24 A.L.R. 1434]; 15 Cal.Jur. 240; Bruton v. Tearle, 7 Cal.

2d 48 [59 PaCal.2d 953, 106 A.L.R. 580]; Thomas v. Thomas, 14 Cal. 2d 355 [94 PaCal.2d 810]; Spalding v. Spalding, 75 Cal. App. 569 [243 p. 445]; Rinkenberger v. Rinkenberger, 99 Cal. App. 45 [277 p. 1096; Mercantile Acceptance Co.

c. Frank, 203 Cal. 483 [265 p. 190, 57 A.L.R. 696]; Barns v. Barns, 9 Cal. App. 2d 427 [50 PaCal.2d 463]; Palen v. Palen, 12 Cal. App. 2d 357 [55 PaCal.2d 228]; Creager v Superior Court, 126 Cal. App.

280 [14 PaCal.2d 552]; Dreesen v. Dreesen, 31 Cal. App. 2d 479 [88 PaCal.2d 223]; Handschy v. Handschy, 32 Cal. App. 2d 504 [90 PaCal.2d 123]; Cummings v. Cummings, 97 Cal. App. 144 [275 p.

245]; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 [30 pp. Ct. 682, 54 L. Ed. 905, 20 Ann. Cas. 1061, 28 L.R.A.

(N. S.) 1068].) “The purpose of the full faith and credit clause should not be lightly dismissed for the sake of a local policy which, if it exists, seems too trivial to be seriously considered when weighed against the policy of constitutional provision and the interest of the State whose judgment is being challenged.” (12:00 p.m.